"Enrollment of the ESP sample was conducted by local CEC staff at each study site. Information from on-site reviewed, plus a survey of CEC staff and numerous discussion with CEC managers, indicate that once standard operating procedures were in place, ESP enrollment became a regular part of local CEC routines. However, staff reductions and reorganizations associated with national changes in the UI program sometimes complicated this process. Initiation and payment of the ESP supplement were operated by a small staff at a central payment office in Halifax. This process, separate from the UI payment system, operated smoothly and effectively" (xii).

"During the ESP intake period (roughly one year), 8,144 displaced workers and 3,414 repeat UI users were enrolled in the study sample. Included in this sample were a broad range of sites, occupations, and demographic characteristics" (xii).

"Staff from CECs in the Displaced Worker study indicated clients were quite interested in ESP, whereas staff from CECs in the Repeat UI User study indicated there was little interest. Focus groups conducted with a small sample of the displaced workers supplement group indicated that many of them were interested in the supplement. Among displaced workers, 97% of those who completed an ESP application agreed to participate in the study. Only 41% of repeat UI users who were given a chance to take part in ESP agreed to do so" (xii).

"responses in a special telephone mini-survey of 343 workers and 229 repeat UI users indicated that they found the information easy to understand and quite helpful; had a good working knowledge of the terms and conditions of the ESP supplement offer; and had a good working knowledge of UI. Hence, they understood the financial benefits of the supplement relative to UI, and knew what to do to receive a supplement" (xii).

"The main effect [of the ESP supplement] will likely broaden the range of job opportunities considered by displaced workers. One-third of the displaced workers in the ESP focus groups said the supplement offer had affected their job search. Mainly they felt it expanded the range of possible jobs they would consider rather than caused them to look for work sooner or more intensely. These findings were further supported by responses to the ESP mini-survey" (xiii).

"Of the repeat workers offered the supplement, 3.8% were paid a supplement for work done by the end of their 12-week job search period. This findings, in conjunction with repeat UI users’ documented lack of interest in the supplement, suggests it is very unlikely the supplement influences their labor market behavior; it simply was not relevant for them" (xiii).

For repeat UI users:

“By the end of the 15th month after the month of random assignment, supplement group members received $7,641 in regular unemployment benefited while control group members received $7,483. The difference…shows that the supplement group received $158 more than the control group. However,…this difference was not statistically significant…This result shows that ESP did not achieve its goal of reducing the amount of unemployment benefits received” (13).

“Similarly, ESP did not reduce the number of weeks of regular unemployment benefits received. The average supplement group member received unemployment benefits for 27.8 weeks during the first 15 months after random assignment. The average control group members received benefits for 0.4 weeks less. Again the difference was not statistically significant” (13).

“ESP, did, however, raise the cost to the government in most months…Supplement group members consistently received more in regular UI benefits and supplement payments combined than was received by control group members as regular benefits alone. However, the differences were small and only significant for a few months” (15).

“In conclusion, ESP was not effective in reducing the use of unemployment benefits by repeat UI users, nor was it effective in decreasing costs to government” (18).

For displaced workers:

“ESP had a small positive effect on rapid re-employment. ESP produced a modest increase in full-time employment toward the end of the six month job-search period. Thus, the program increased the percentage of displaced workers who became re-employed full time during this period by 4.4 percentage points. This reflected, in roughly equal parts, a shift from part-time to full-time employment, and an increase in overall employment” (ES-4).

“ESP’s effect on hastening re-employment may have caused a few displaced workers to take jobs that paid less than the ones they would have taken otherwise. The program may have caused average earnings during the 15-month follow-up period to be $682 or 4.6 percent lower than they would have been otherwise, presumably by inducing a few supplement group members to take lower-paying jobs. Hourly wage rates were $0.33 or 2.5 percent less than they would have been otherwise” (ES-4).

“ESP had virtually no effect on the amount or duration of unemployment benefits received by supplement group members. The estimated program impact on average weeks of unemployment benefit payments during the first 15 months after random assignment was 0.2 weeks or 0.9 percent. The estimated impact on total benefits received was $90 or 1.4 percent” (ES-4).

“ESP produced a modest transfer of resources from the Canadian government (taxpayers) to the 2 out of 10 displaced workers who received supplement payments. This helped to compensate recipients for the losses they incurred in a way that did not inhibit re-employment. On average, supplement group members experienced a small financial gain of $569 during the first 15 months after random assignment. This was because the supplement payments they received exceeded the earnings loss they incurred and their unemployment benefit payments made to the small fraction of displaced workers who received them was an important sources of temporary income for this subgroup” (ES-4).

“ESP produced a net financial cost for the Canadian government of $1,340 per supplement group member during the first 15 months after random assignment. This occurred because supplements paid did not reduce unemployment benefits paid” (ES-4).

“The findings from ESP indicate that supplements probably will not improve the labor market prospects of displaced workers markedly or reduce their unemployment benefit payments substantially. Implementing an earnings supplement program might be appropriate, however, if the goal is to provide direct financial compensation to displaced workers who must take lower-paying jobs in the future and this will pay a disproportionately higher share of the costs of economic progress” (88).

• Those who claim EI the most also know how to benefit the most from its rules.
• Employers may play a role in their employees' EI claim patterns.
• EI claim patterns should be examined in the context of household decisions.
• EI does not appear to be a consistent influence on individuals' decisions to move between and within provinces.
• Seasonal workers are not by definition frequent claimants of EI.
• A minority of frequent claimants remain frequent claimants over time.