“The Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 is causing surprisingly large and extensive changes on a bipartisan basis in the signaling, organization, and aims of social programs for the poor (9).”

“Especially notable is what we call “second order devolution,” whereby states are assigning greater responsibility to local jurisdictions and groups of public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations. There is great diversity in the way this second-order devolution is occurring and in the organizational and institutional structures responsible for social programs for the poor (9).”

“A new political equilibrium may be emerging on welfare and work in many states, which may over time detoxify these programs and make it possible for public and nonprofit agencies to do more and work together better to deal with the problems of the most disadvantaged poor children and families (9).”

“Most states are pursuing a “work first” strategy for welfare, which represents a shift from the education/human-capital investment strategy under the Family Support Act of 1988, which created the JOBS program (9).”

“States are devoting unexpected priority to what are called “diversion” programs to prevent families from becoming cash assistance recipients. Although some of these diversion programs only involve one-time cash grants in lieu of applying for continuing assistance, some states are using diversion to expand their repertoire of short-term solutions to financial crises affecting families, such as immediate job search assistance, short-term services, and referrals to other public or private agencies (9).”

“Reorganization efforts are underway in many states to assign the major responsibilities for TANF cash assistance to employment bureaucracies, combined with a related effort to change the signaling and culture of these programs to emphasize self-support. Although some states have consolidated responsibilities and operations into one agency and even a small number of divisions, many of these programs are spreading across a large number of entities (10).”

“Increasingly the key to implementing these and related welfare reforms is developing and operating information systems that can provide on-line, linked data for case tracking and case management… Although many tasks and responsibilities are being passed down to local governments, local state offices, and private service organizations, their welfare information systems remain more accessible and responsive to state and federal reporting requirements than to local administrative and case management needs. We are also seeing tension and confusion between local and central authorities about what ought to be reported. It is increasingly clear that information about the treatments people receive is not being captured at all, even though these treatments are becoming increasingly varied and complex; and these is considerable disagreement across and within all levels of government over operational measures of program performance. Indeed, many of the state information systems report little more than caseload information. Whatever the local agencies are doing or accomplishing, not very much can be learned about their activities from the data they are collecting, collating, and reporting (10).”

Most states have not worked out financial penalties, rewards, or allocation rules that are completely consistent with the official goals of their new welfare programs (10).”

Although many states are encouraging program experimentation by allowing selected counties or regions to apply different policies or administrative structures from those used in the rest of the state —such as pilot privatization projects- most states are making little or no effort to evaluate how these variations might affect program performance or outcomes (10).”

• Service integration is happening now to a wide degree, even as state and local governments have increased the number and variety of services to integrate. Major changes are occurring at the ground level in program signals, services, and sanctions. We are now seeing much greater variation in the purposes and operations of state and local welfare systems and social services.
• The shift in welfare cultures toward a greater emphasis on work and welfare avoidance, combined with the growth of discretion and variation among local systems, raises many important issues for state implementation and also creates new challenges for program evaluation. To the extent that local welfare systems move from essentially regulatory agencies that distribute benefits according to complex yet standardized rules, to problem-solving structures in which case managers can use a wide variety of tools to move family heads into jobs or off of welfare, program success may be affected by which organization is running the local office, who the case managers are, what values and skills they bring to their job, how well staffed the local offices are, the relations between offices and personnel of different agencies, and a host of other factors. This in turn creates difficulties in attributing causes to differences in program effects across and within states. With greater local discretion, it is not at all easy to know how sanctions, personal responsibility agreements, or a large menu of services are being used. It is hard to assess what causes what without an extensive understanding of how local offices are exercising their discretion and what combination of tools they emphasize in their relations with families.
• Different families may receive very different treatments within a single state or even a single office. Some differences in treatment are more justifiable than others - and some cannot be justified at all. To address these issues, states may have to decide exactly where some sort of rough equality is needed as well as where it is not.
• These equity and evaluation questions are manifestations of the general issue of accountability in the new welfare. More decisions are being made locally and individually, but there is still not a lot of information being passed up (and down) about those decisions or their consequences. Many information systems are still only sharing at providing basic information about caseloads and eligibility information. Work participation rates are being calculated and reported, but there is not a lot of information that states can use in deciding why caseloads or work participation rates are higher or lower over time or across sites… Medicaid, food stamps, child care, indeed, the functioning (or lack of functioning) of the social safety net, are now inextricably affected by the interpretations given to policy, not just by states and localities, but sometimes by individual case managers.
• Accountability also requires that someone use this information, not in a sporadic and general way, but in routine, particularized ways for case management and program oversight. Some states and private organizations are beginning to address this institutional question by developing new independent entities for accountability. In a devolved and highly complex system, new and more localized instruments for accountability need to be developed, and these instruments need to reflect the will to assess and check the new exercise of power without undermining the basic purposes of reforms.

"West Virginia has begun to fashion its own approach to welfare reform, one that fits its challenging economic and social conditions. But the state did not do this all at once. WV WORKS began with a strong emphasis on caseload reduction by counting SSI as income, by persuading people not to enroll in TANF assistance and to rely on other sources (such as Food Stamps), and by confronting people with complex processes involving eligibility determination, enrollment, and work requirements. As Plein shows, however, this case-clearing approach showed limitations. Caseloads declined, but they eventually stalled and crept back up, partly as families who left the welfare rolls began to return. Political support for the SSI provision declined, and administrators seemed concerned about the state’s low work participation rates.

The state thus began to evolve a somewhat different strategy. It took advantage of the 1999 administrative rules promulgated by the federal Administration for Children and Families, rules that allowed states to offer a wide array of services to families, especially working families, without being subject to the federal time limits. Using this flexibility, new emphases were assigned to such goals as pre-venting families who left the rolls from returning and addressing the needs of people who have not left the rolls. The state has also placed greater emphasis on a wider variety of work activities —especially work experience and community service —than most states have to date.

These and Plein’s many other insights suggest larger points about welfare reform and devolution. It demonstrates, for example, how dynamic the new welfare systems are. Although there are important continuities, dating back to each state’s AFDC program, the new systems can be subject to quick and important changes. This dynamism is facilitated by the enormous flexibility states were given under TANF in designing and revising their mix of services, client targets, and program signals, especially after HHS released its new rules in 1999.

This flexibility and dynamism suggests that states can adapt their programs to weaker economic conditions in now and in the future. However, there are some important challenges evident in the West Virginia story. Simple diversion efforts — such as jawboning people off the rolls and offering short-term cash grants —may not keep the rolls down. Also, it is clear that a recession will be costly. West Virginia found that their work experience program —offered in lieu of unsubsidized jobs because of their scarcity —required them to increase their low maximum benefit levels in order to compensate participants working 30 hours per week at the minimum wage. Other low benefit states may face similar incentives to reduce the enormous state-to-state gaps in maximum benefits as states become employers of last resort. This tendency may put budgetary pressures on low-benefit states, since the TANF funding formula is based on AFDC spending patterns, which were strongly affected by state maximum benefit levels. Plein also discerns administrative challenges in managing these new and ever-changing programs. One observation is the limited integration of services for the growing number of families not on cash assistance. TANF has led many states to consolidate services for people on TANF assistance. But now that TANF is serving many people not on cash assistance, it would be reasonable to streamline the provision of services for working families not on the rolls. Yet these families still face organizationally fragmented service systems, which cannot easily address complex needs."

State welfare systems have added a new focus on the work and independence goals of the federal TANF block grant in their policies, institutions, spending patterns, and administrative practices.

While states are paying more attention to goals relating to marriage, two-parent families, and pregnancy prevention than they were before TANF, this area still receives far less attention than work goals. Within the domain of family formation, states are focusing on reducing teen-pregnancy rates through programs that predate TANF.

The goals of work and independence have been implemented largely by putting into effect a version of “workfirst” with several major components:

State variations: Although states have generally implemented workfirst systems that rely heavily on processes as signals, work support services, and unsubsidized employment, important variations exist and differences appear to be growing. One critical division among state welfare reforms is between those that give greater weight to policy “sticks” and caseload reduction as a performance goal, and those that put greater stress on policy “carrots” and work engagement:

Challenges and areas where change has been minimal:

This report reviews research and dissemination efforts on the implications of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. In FY 2001, Rockefeller Institute staff drew extensively from that research to disseminate findings about what has —and has not —changed under devolution, what kinds of new social service systems are evolving, and what are the implications of those developments for the reauthorization of TANF. These findings include:

"The 1996 welfare reform law increased state flexibility over a range of policy choices, while imposing a new set of mandates and incentives to move in specific policy directions. States have used their discretion to adopt a number of policies designed to lower barriers to work, such as disregarding more income in calculating benefit levels and easing limits on the value of autos and financial assets. Many states have also adopted policies that restrict access to benefits, such as imposing stiffer sanctions for recipients who do not cooperate with work requirements and shorter time limits than those mandated by the federal government. The packages of policy choices vary widely across states. States that receive higher block grants per low-income child are more likely to pursue generous income supplementation policies, while the political characteristics of a state are more closely related to policies intended to restrict access to Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). There is little evidence thus far of an overall "race to the bottom" in TANF policies."

"Utah’s approach to welfare reform, like that of other states, focuses on promoting work. Every part of the welfare system is oriented toward that goal. The DWS and other state agencies have largely decided not to take on the life-style and family stability issues such as teen pregnancy and strengthening two parent families, that many conservatives champion. There is a long tradition of limited government intervention in such matters. The main focus of effort is to get women into the work force, through an aggressive planning process that provides support to get into the labor market, and the imposition of sanctions to deter noncompliance."

"From the perspective of reducing welfare rolls and reorienting welfare agencies, Utah’s welfare reform efforts have largely been a success. State agencies have been transformed. The Department of Workforce Services and the Department of Human Services have made significant progress in the area of service integration. The number of recipients have fallen dramatically and many have moved into the workforce. The goal of helping families receiving assistance become self-supporting is more difficult to assess. Some families face multiple barriers and may never be able to be self-supporting. Others will need more help than the three-year time limit allows. Some may be able to work their way out of poverty but we will not know until the next economic downturn how secure their economic future is. Utah has not invested as much in education and career development as some recipients will likely need to move out of poverty."

"The goal of self-support can mean earning enough to no longer quality for cash assistance, or it can mean a job that pays enough to rise above poverty. The Utah welfare reform program, like those of other states, may achieve only the first goal. The question of whether the state is doing enough to help families move from poverty to a sustainable level of income, rather than simply moving beyond the minimum income level provided by cash assistance is not just an empirical question to be answered during the next several years. It is also intertwined with an important normative debate that underlies welfare reform debate in Utah and elsewhere. From one view, welfare reform is all about self-sufficiency—helping families who have been dependent on assistance in getting off the rolls and becoming independent. While some advocates of such a view want to reduce government spending, they more broadly represent the view that people are best served by being independent and self-sufficient—that it is in their own interest to be free from having to depend on others for their income. Others counter that interdependence, not independence, is the more appropriate social goal—that welfare should be built on the recognition that we are all dependent on each other, responsible for each other, able to call on each other for help, and committed to ensuring that those who have the most skills, resources, energy, and other productive attributes help those who have fewer resources."

"While some argue that there is now widespread agreement over the shortcomings of the old welfare system and the elements of the new one, others insist that the debate continue along these broad, ideological lines. Should the ultimate goal be minimal government, so that people are largely on their own, self-supporting and autonomous, or should the objective be a more connected community, with more interaction, responsibility, and sharing of resources? If the state opts for the latter, should that community be underwritten by government, or should it be voluntary, left to private groups and efforts? Should the state accept whatever poverty results from giving families three (or five) years of assistance or should state officials and others continually seek ways to improve well-being, decrease inequalities, and increase opportunities? The former, more libertarian view, dominates the national debate over reinventing welfare. But strong voices defend the alternative view and are looking for a forum in which to explore the much broader agenda of reducing poverty and finding new ways to offer low-income families and their children in particular access to more opportunities for education, health, and progress."

"One of the most important outcomes of welfare reform in Utah is the recognition that governments can formulate and implement major changes in policy in a relatively short time period. While the consequences of such changes are uncertain at best, and sometimes unfortunate, they are at least evidence that the policymaking process can respond to criticism. A large part of what made welfare reform possible was a strong consensus that the old system did not work. Liberals came to embrace the importance of work; conservatives came to accept the idea that poor people need help from government. The latter made some level of commitment to engage in practical, problem-solving efforts rather than partisan wrangling."

"Unfortunately, welfare reform has addressed only a small part of the agenda surrounding poor families, and much more remains to be done to help them escape poverty. Welfare policymakers and analysts in Utah and elsewhere have much to learn about the causes of poverty, and how to design and implement policies that will help those most in need of assistance. Welfare is not yet a public problem that has been solved, but only a problem that is now beginning to be addressed differently than before. Policy innovation is a continuing public need in fashioning a new round of public policies, including state-private partnerships and other efforts that address the causes of poverty and the need for welfare, including spouse abuse, job discrimination, poor health, inadequate development of social skills, and poor education. The limited success of welfare reform is an encouraging sign that perhaps additional policy changes can address these root causes and prevent some of the problems that welfare systems are created to repair."