“The majority of features included in Indiana’s ambitious and comprehensive welfare reform were successfully implemented and fully operational”(vi).

“There were four areas in which implementation was not wholly successful. These areas included: (1) enhanced intake, (2) the school attendance requirement, (3) case management for IMPACT clients, and (4) completely limiting communications about welfare reform provisions with the control group”(vii).

Interim Impact Findings:

“One general finding is that many clients leave welfare fairly quickly with no additional incentives or assistance from the agency”(xi).

“Analysis of early impacts on AFDC outcomes reveals comparatively large negative impacts on average total welfare payments”(xii).

“Impacts for mandatory clients could have several possible sources, including intensified E&T participation, and the shift to a Work First model, and time limits and earnings incentives specific to the Placement task. The weight of evidence thus far points to an invigorated IMPACT program. In particular, process study findings suggest the transition to a Work First approach exerted far more pervasive effects on both staff and clients at the local level than technical provisions such as time limits and earnings incentives”(xiv).

“The reform led to lower fractions of treatment than control families receiving AFDC payments, an effect also concentrated among IMPACT-mandatory clients”(xiv).

“The reform had much smaller effects on the percent of families remaining technically eligible for AFDC- that is, those the State considered to be “active” AFDC cases- than on the percent actually receiving payments...The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is that the reform seeks to encourage work and “make work pay” by allowing clients in the placement track to retain eligibility for AFDC-related child care, Medicaid, and other supportive services even after their earnings exceed the payment standard (and result in a “zero grant”)”(xiv).

“Relatively large impacts on payment receipt, especially for recent applicants, point to a substantial role for welfare reform in Indiana’s impressive recent caseload declines”(xv).

"The State’s employment and training program shifted to a Work First model" (ii).

"Indiana implemented a two-track service model for more and less job ready clients" (iv).

"Some signs suggest time limits’ influence on behavior will grow" (v).

"Indiana implemented personal responsibility agreements (PRA), but the program’s emphasis on parenting responsibilities was not as forceful as its emphasis on work" (vi).

Interim Impact Findings:

"Many recipients subject to the Indiana reform worked and many left welfare over the two-year follow-up period"(ix).

"Welfare reform contributed to increases in employment and decreases in welfare in Indiana. Impacts were concentrated among job-ready recipients without young children" (x).

"Impact patterns suggests employment impacts derive from more rapid job entry" (xiii).

"The Zero-Grant policy dampened impacts on TANF eligibility and slightly increased the accumulation of time on lifetime assistance clocks" (xiii).

"Maintaining employment remains a substantial challenge for most recipients who go to work" (xiv).

"Welfare reform increased the share of income from earnings, but not average total income" (xv).

• Overall, analyses of the survey data suggest the program did not have large impacts on elementary school-age children (those between 5 and 12).
• Welfare reform had no statistically significant impacts on education or health outcomes
• For outcomes involving social behavior and emotional well-being, the study found only one statistically significant impact: the increase in arrest rates for the subset of elementary school-age children who were 10 to 12 years old at the time. It is not clear whether this is a real effect of welfare reform or only a chance artifact of multiple significance tests.
• The program did not affect average household income.
• The program did increase adult's employment, which was accompanied by a slight increase in child care use.

• For all but one of the small number of outcomes available for adolescents, the study found no statistically significant impact of welfare reform. The exception was a small adverse effect on adolescents' school performance

• Indiana implemented a strong work first program.
• The switch to an integrated worker model posed challenges.
• Welfare reform led to increased local control over service delivery and reliance on contracting for services.
• Indiana made ongoing changes to its performance-based contracting process.

• For both the first-year and later cohorts, Indiana’s program produced positive and statistically significant impacts on overall IMPACT participation rates and on rates of participation in each of the three IMPACT activity types.
• Only about 7% of Welfare Reform group members reached the 24 month adult time limit within five years of follow up.
• Compared to their likelihood of reaching the time limit, Welfare Reform group members were twice as likely to have had a family cap birth.
• For the first year cohort, the Personal Responsibility Agreement (PRA) sanctions were more likely to be applied than the family cap or the 24 month limit.

First Cohort
• Indiana's program reduced receipt of TANF and food stamps.
• Indiana's welfare reform program increased earnings and employment rates in each of the follow-up years.
• Welfare reform did not affect total income.
• Welfare reform did not affect health insurance rates for adults or children.
• Indiana's program did not affect reported child maltreatment.

Later Cohort
• TANF payments for the later cohort were larger than the former cohort.
• Indiana’s program increased the average employment rate across the eight follow-up quarters but did not significantly increase earnings.
• Indiana’s program did not produce impacts on income (measured as the sum of earnings, TANF payments, and food stamp benefits).
• Welfare reform may have decreased substantiated child maltreatment reports.

• The economic benefits of welfare reform of families, resulting mainly from increased employment, slightly outweighed the loss of welfare payments and other income.
• Welfare reform benefited tax payers because savings more than offset welfare expenditures.