For survey data: 137 welfare recipients (households) who entered the no benefit period of the LBP between November 1995 and January 1996.

Program Requirements: The LBP is a sanction for failure to meet strengthened JOBS participation requirements including the FIA.

“The Well-Being Visit Program began as an effort to ensure the well-being of children in families on Iowa’s Limited Benefit Plan. However, the current program has several limitations that seriously compromise its ability to achieve that objective. First, the program does not reach most children in LBP families. Only 40 percent of referred families even receive a visit, and children are present at less than half of those visits. Second, the visits do not emphasize child well-being. Instead, they focus primarily on informing clients about FIP and PROMISE JOBS policies and only secondarily on well-being issues, if at all. Consequently, the public health professionals who staff the program have come to question its use of their skills and its value to DHS and to the Iowa families it serves (xvi).”

Current LBP policy has three points of vulnerability that enable clients to benefit financially from cycling on and off FIP and the LBP: First, contact with PROMISE JOBS is not a prerequisite for resumption of FIP cash assistance after the end of a first LBP. Rather, contact and compliance with PROMISE JOBS is required only after a FIP application is filed and approved.

Second, after PROMISE JOBS requirements take effect for clients returning to FIP after a first LBP, clients report that there are delays between their act of noncompliance and PROMISE JOBS’ response.

Third, even after noncompliance is detected, the onset of a second LBP may be delayed due to the LBP review process (for clients with self-sufficiency plans in place) or other administrative procedures.

Former LBP clients who return to FIP may temporarily receive cash assistance while not meeting PROMISE JOBS participation requirements. MPR believes that pending policy changes should eliminate some of these vulnerabilities y requiring LBP clients to comply with PROMISE JOBS before they can return to LBP.

The incidence of recidivism is not trivial. This study shows that about one-quarter of all FIP clients assigned to a first LBP ultimately enter a second LBP. Pending LBP policy changes may reduce LBP recidivism through stricter rules that will require clients to comply with PROMISE JOBS employment and training activities prior to reapproval of a FIP application. Depending on the outcomes of these policy changes, further steps may be desired to reduce repeat assignments to the LBP. This study suggests that it would be more difficult to identify those LBP clients who are more at risk of a second LBP than other first LBP clients. Therefore, it may be more practical for future efforts to prevent repeat LBP assignments on all clients who return to FIP after a first LBP.

Nearly half of second assignments to the LBP result from clients failing to attend scheduled appointments required for the development and fulfillment of an FIA. Clients most often cite a personal or family circumstance, such as conflicting work schedules or lack of transportation, as the immediate reason for their noncompliance. However, beneath these immediate reasons often lie one or more fundamental barriers to compliance, such as inadequate communication or problem-solving skills.

While some clients experienced a decline in their standard of living after entering a second LBP, most experienced an increase or no change. The fact that some FIP clients enter a second LBP implies that they have repeatedly failed to gather the resources to develop and carry out an FIA. Nonetheless, one in a second LBP, it appears that most of these clients are able to gather the resources to make ends meet without FIP cash assistance. Many increase their employment, rely on social support networks, and utilize government assistance rather than FIP during a second LBP.