“The delayed exit effect was small. Despite widespread concern about entry effects among both policymakers and researchers, results from this first-ever experimental test of entry effects indicate that very few welfare recipients prolong their stay on IA in order to become eligible for SSP’s earnings supplement. Thirteen months after random assignment, 57.2% of new recipients assigned to the program group had received welfare benefits in 12 of the first 13 months after entering IA, versus 54.1% of the control group, a just barely statistically significant difference of 3.1 percentage points” (vii).

“Effects grow only slightly over time. The size of the impact- that is, the difference in the percent of program versus control group members on IA- does grow slightly over time, but no sharp jumps are evident in the last few months before establishing eligibility”(vii).

“Most eligible people understood the offer. As a typical program benchmark, the Entry Effects Demonstration was designed to provide information comparable with what the program and control group members would know about the IA system’s work incentives, which disregard (do not count) some earnings when welfare benefits were calculated. By that measure, program group members were generally well informed about the supplement offer” (vii).

“Even among those who were most knowledgeable about SSP’s future earnings supplement offer, impacts remained fairly small. Some 60.9% of “informed program group members” remained on IA for 12 of the prior 13 months, versus 56.1% of control group members- an impact difference of 5 percentage points, still a fairly small effect” (viii).

“IA recipients explained that they were reluctant to remain on IA longer just to gain eligibility for SSP because they disliked welfare and because it was difficult to find work. Moreover, single parents’ daily lives involve a delicate balance between the demands of child rearing and the demands of work. These forces preclude many recipients from planning their welfare behavior around the timing of SSP eligibility” (viii).

“SSP’s one year eligibility restriction effectively limits both delayed exits and new applicant entry effects. On balance, the results suggest that the one-year eligibility restriction for the SSP program successfully limits the size of the overall entry effects generated by the new supplement offer. Moreover, the finding that delayed exit effects among new recipients were small, and that they did not emerge until recipients had been on welfare for several months, suggests that the new applicants entry effect generated by SSP may also be negligible” (viii).

“Enrollment of the ESP sample was conducted by local CEC staff at each study site. Information from on-site reviews, plus a survey of CEC staff and numerous discussions with CEC managers, indicate that once standard operating procedures were in place, ESP enrollment became a regular part of local CEC routines. However, staff reductions and reorganizations associated with national changes in the UI program sometimes complicated this process. Initiation and payment of the ESP supplement were operated by a small staff at a central Payment Office in Halifax. This process, separate from the UI payment system, operated smoothly and effectively” (xii).

“During the ESP intake period (roughly one year), 8,144 displaced workers and 3,414 repeat UI users were enrolled in the study sample. Included in this sample were a broad range of sites, occupations, and demographic characteristics” (xii).

“Staff from CECs in the Displaced Worker study indicate clients were quite interested in ESP, whereas staff from CECs in the Repeat UI User study indicated that there was little interest” (xii).

“Responses to a special telephone “mini-survey” of 343 displaced workers and 229 repeat UI users indicated that they found the information provided easy to understand and quite helpful; had a good working knowledge of the terms and conditions of the ESP supplement offer; and had a good working knowledge of UI. Hence, they understood the financial benefits of the supplement relative to UI, and knew what to do to receive a supplement” (xii).

“The main effect will likely be to broaden the range of job opportunities considered by displaced workers. One-third of the displaced workers in the ESP focus groups said the supplement offer had affected their job search. Mainly they felt it expanded the range of possible jobs they would consider rather than caused them to look for work sooner or more intensely. These findings were further supported by responses from the ESP mini-survey” (xii).

“Of the repeat UI users offered the supplement, 3.8% were paid a supplement for work done by the end of their 12 week job search period. This finding, in conjunction with repeat UI users’ documented lack of interest in the supplement, suggests it is very unlikely the supplement influenced their labor market behavior; it simply was not relevant for them” (xiii).

“Of the displaced workers offered the supplement, it is projected that 16% will be paid a supplement for work done by the end of their 26 week job search period. Since previous research proposes that about one-third of all displaced workers typically experience a re-employment earnings loss, this findings suggests that many displaced workers who could benefit from a supplement actually received one” (xiii).

"SSP doubles the full-time employment rate of the program group" (2).

"The additional employment generated by SSP appears to be concentrated at wage rates between the minimum wage and $2 per hour above the minimum" (2).

"SSP reduced Income Assistance receipt" (2).

"In the short run, SSP increased total transfer payments" (3).

"Every $1 the government spent on additional transfer payments bought more than $2 of increased earnings ands led to more than $3 of additional income for program group members" (3).

"SSP had a substantial anti-poverty effect" (3).

"SSP helped working-poor families meet their basic needs" (3).

“By supplementing earnings to make work pay, SSP substantially increased employment.

“Because many new welfare recipients are relatively skilled, SSP resulted in numerous high wage jobs.

“By requiring full-time work, SSP increased earnings by more than a third. “Most supplement payments are going to people who would have remained on Income Assistance without the supplement offer.

“SSP led to no increase in net public transfer payments.

“SSP reduced poverty by a substantial amount” (ES-4).

“A range of pre- and post-employment services were successfully implemented.

“SSP Plus program group members received more job-search and other services then did regular SSP program group members.

“The additional services in SSP Plus led to an increase in the percentage of persons who took advantage of the supplement offer.

“The additional services in SSP Plus led to a small increase in full-time employment and a decrease in receipt of Income Assistance.

“Despite small impacts on full-time employment and Income Assistance, the additional services in SSP Plus led to a modest increase in after-tax family income” (ES-3).

“At its peak, the program doubled the number of people who worked full time. Its effect on full-time employment continued to be strong throughout the end of the third year.”

“SSP increased earnings by nearly 30 percent or about $2,700 per person over the three-year period. Since only about one-third of participants took up the supplement offer, SSP increased earnings by about $8,000 among supplement participants.”

“Welfare payments decreased by 10 percent.”

“SSP increased income by 16 percent over the three years period. Three years after people had entered the evaluation, SSP had increased the number of families with income above Statistics Canada’s low income cut-off by 68 percent.”

“SSP promoted stable employment and helped increase wages.”

“SSP increased the number of single parents who subsequently married or were in common-law relationships in New Brunswick by about 20 percent, but reduced marriage and common-law relationships in British Columbia by a similar amount.”

“After accounting for taxes, the provincial and federal governments spent about $50 more per families in monthly cash transfer payments.”

“SSP increased full-time employment, earnings and income, and reduced poverty.”

“SSP had no effects on the youngest children’s functioning.”

“SSP increased the number of young children in child care.”

“For the middle cohort, SSP has small positive effects on children’s cognitive and school outcomes. On many other measures, program and control groups did not differ.”

“Children in the middle cohort program group were more likely than their peers in the control group to be cared for by baby-sitters and relatives, and to participate in lessons and sports after school.”

“For children in the older cohort, SSP may have increased minor delinquency and tobacco, alcohol, and drug use. The program did not affect many other outcomes that were examined.”

“For older children, SSP did not affect after-school activities, but older children in the program group took on greater responsibilities and experienced more changes in family structure than did their peers in the control group.”

“Small effects on children’s outcomes for the middle and older cohorts of children may be masking more pronounced effects for children in families that took up the supplement.”

• By supplementing earnings to make work pay, the Self-Sufficiency Project substantially increased employment.
• By requiring full-time work, SSP substantially increased earnings.
• SSP led to no increase in net public transfer payments.
• Most employment resulting from SSP was stable.
• SSP reduced poverty by a substantial amount.

By supplementing earnings to make work pay, SSP substantially increased employment and earnings. During the fourth year after random assignment the program group worked full time for 5.4 months with earnings of $11,950 on average compared with 4.3 months with earnings of $10,333 for the control group.

The addition of job search and employment services to the earnings supplement helped a large number of program group members find full time work and take advantage of the supplement offer. Approximately half of those offered both the supplement and services found a full-time job in their first year in order to qualify for the supplement compared to only a third of those regular program group members not offered employment services. The combination of employment services and an earnings supplement generated large impacts on employment, earnings, income and welfare receipt when compared with the control group who received neither employment services nor the supplement. Most of the effects of SSP Plus are attributable to the supplement offer. While those offered SSP Plus services were better able to obtain jobs in the first year of the program, they also lost their jobs more quickly. As a result, the addition of employment services only had small incremental effects on employment, earnings, income and welfare receipt.

• Fifty eight percent of program group members became eligible for the supplement by remaining on income assistance for a year or more.
• SSP increased full time employment and reduced IA receipt for five years.
• SSP substantially increased earnings through to the sixth year of the followup period.
• SSP increased income and reduced poverty throughout much of the followup period.
• SSP required a very low increase in net cost to government budgets.
• SSP produced larger financial gains for welfare applicants than for longterm recipients, and was much more cost effective in doing so.
• If SSP were implemented as a policy, it would be effective initially in reducing the current IA caseload and would be even more effective in the long run.

• Three reasons were identified for not participating in the experiment:
  1. Some participants were simply not selected at baseline.
  2. Some were selected but refused to participate.
  3. Some were selected but could not be reached at baseline.
• Researchers found strong evidence of non-response bias in the data. When they correct for the bias, they find the estimates of the treatment effect that rely solely on experimental data underestimate the true impact of the program. They conjecture this is because those who agreed to participate have longer mean spell durations and are likely less responsive to financial incentives than others.
• No evidence of the so-called “delayed exit effect” that may arise due to the program set-up.
• Finally, the sensitivity of the parameter estimates to distributional assumptions pertaining to the unobserved heterogeneity is also investigated. We find many parametric distributions yield similar results to those obtained from a simple non-parametric model.

• Estimates suggest the time limit decreased full-time work for those who had taken up full-time work primarily from voluntary job leaving.

• We find that some measures of improved mental health are associated with increases in the probability of employment.
• Using an instrumental variable based on the controlled nature of the experiment, we also find that full-time employment decreases the probability of longterm emotional problems.
• Furthermore, we identify individuals for whom the program tested by SSP is particularly cost-effective based on their mental health status.
• We also show that the SSP program is a cost-effective policy tool that can increase the employment of individuals with long-term emotional problems.

• Researchers found significant short-term impacts of SSP on unemployment and employment durations.
• SSP appears to have long-term positive impact on the employment rate of the take-up program group.