Random assignment to program and control groups. Statewide, 17,723 cases were randomly assigned through 12/96.

Additional notes: Families are assigned to three sets of rules: group 1, 20% of the caseload, qualifies for pre-reform services; group 2, 20% of caseload, is subject to all provisions of welfare reform except time limits or work requirements; group 3, 60% of caseload, is subject to all provisions of welfare reform.

The full WRP program — including both the incentives and the time limit — generated a modest increase in employment during the pre-time limit period. Sixty-eight percent of WRP group members worked at some point in the 21-month period compared with 63 percent of the ANFC group. In addition, the program slightly increased the rate of participation in Reach Up. WRP did not affect the rate of ANFC receipt — about 55 percent of each group were receiving ANFC at the end of the follow-up period — nor did it change the average amount of welfare received or people’s average combined income from public assistance and earnings. WRP’s time limit was necessary for generating impacts. WRP’s financial incentives alone had little or no impact on employment and slightly increased the proportion of people receiving ANFC during the last three months of the follow-up period. Adding the time limit to the incentives generated an increase in employment and a decrease in welfare receipt. In assessing these results, however, it is important to note that many of the benefits provided through WRP’s incentive package are also available, at least to some degree, to members of the ANFC group through other programs.

Longer-term results for single parents: A more substantial difference in the "treatment" provided to the three groups emerged when recipients in the WRP group began to approach the 30-month time limit. WRP group members are required to participate in job search activities during the two months before they are due to reach the time limit. Once they reach the limit, they must work in an unsubsidized job (if they can find one) or a community service job. To begin to capture the impact of WRP’s work mandates, the analysis looks at longer-term (33-month) results for people who entered the study early on.

Once recipients started reaching the time limit, WRP began to increase substantially the proportion of those who were working while on welfare. DSW records show that in Months 27 and 29 of the follow-up period there was only a modest difference between the WRP group and the ANFC group in the proportion who received ANFC and did not report employment. However, by Month 33 a substantial difference had emerged: 32 percent of ANFC group members were receiving ANFC and had no reported employment compared with only 23 percent of the WRP group. Thus, once the time limit began to take effect, WRP began to reduce substantially the number of people who relied solely on public aid — a key goal of the program. Although these longer-term results are promising, two caveats are necessary. First, the results are based on a small group of early enrollees; results for the full sample may be different. Second, because the longer-term data were drawn exclusively from DSW records, it is not possible to say whether WRP generated an increase in employment or only an increase in employment that was reported to the department. Staff are making a serious effort to implement the post-time limit work requirement, and few recipients appear to be falling through the cracks. Nevertheless, at any point in time a substantial proportion of recipients are neither working nor exempt from the work requirement, despite having passed the time limit. Detailed case studies indicate that frequent changes in the status of recipients, the absence of strong enforcement tools, and other factors make it very difficult for staff to ensure that everyone is working at all times. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the post-time limit experience so far is that very few clients have entered community service employment slots. This is seen as an encouraging sign, because it means that a large majority of the clients who are meeting WRP’s work requirement are in unsubsidized jobs.

Results for two-parent families. The "treatment" difference among the three research groups may be smaller for two-parent families in the ANFC-Unemployed Parent (UP) program than it is for single-parent families. Although WRP’s changes in welfare eligibility rules make it substantially easier for certain groups of needy two-parent families to receive assistance, the potential impact of the time limit (15 months for ANFC-UP cases) is muted by the fact that principal wage earners in all three groups are subject to work-related mandates throughout their families’ time on welfare.2

WRP generated a modest increase in ANFC receipt among ANFC-UP families: 79 percent of families in the WRP group received ANFC benefits at some point in the follow-up period compared with 73 percent of families in the ANFC group. In addition, parents in the WRP group were somewhat more likely to work: 62 percent of principal earners in the WRP group worked in the last three months of the follow-up period compared with 57 percent in the ANFC group; however, this difference was not large enough to be confidently attributed to the new policy. Finally, WRP group members were somewhat more likely to participate in Reach Up, especially in job search activities.

Just under 10 percent of Vermont’s ANFC cases are two-parent families in which one parent is incapacitated. The able-bodied parent in such families is subject to the same time limit and work requirement rules as the sole parent in a single-parent family.

During the first 21 months of the follow-up period, WRP’s time limit increased employment among two-parent families with an incapacitated parent. In the last quarter of the follow-up period, 50 percent of families in the WRP group had at least one working parent, compared with 40 percent in the WRP Incentives Only group. Adding the time limit also increased the proportion of families who combined work and welfare: 21 percent in the WRP group, compared with 13 percent in the WRP Incentives Only group.

Once single parents began to reach WRP’s 30-month work-trigger time limit, the program began to substantially increase employment rates and reduce the proportion of parents who received welfare without working.

The work-trigger time limit was necessary for producing impacts: WRP’s financial incentives alone generated no significant changes in employment or in-come for single-parent families.

WRP changed the composition of income for single-parent families: They re-lied more on earnings and less on cash assistance. However, because the de-crease in cash assistance largely offset the increase in earnings, the program did not affect these families’ total combined income from public assistance and earnings. These results do not include the federal or state earned income tax credits, which provide additional income to many working families.

WRP’s impacts for two-parent families with an incapacitated parent were generally similar to those for single-parent families.

WRP did not significantly increase employment or earnings among two-parent Unemployed Parent (UP) families, but the program’s incentives and changes in eligibility rules increased cash assistance receipt and payment amounts.

"Although WRP planners originally estimated that large numbers of welfare recipients would need CSE slots in order to meet the work requirement, in fact CSE was rarely used. Of more than 3,000 single parents analyzed as part of the WRP evaluation, only about 2 percent ever worked in a CSE position within roughly four years after enrollment. Most of the recipients who became subject to the work requirement were able to obtain unsubsidized jobs in the strong labor market of the late 1990s."

"CSE was designed to serve a dual purpose: (1) to give parents meaningful work in order to meet the WRP work requirement and (2) to improve participants’ ability to obtain unsubsidized jobs. MDRC’s survey found that parents who were placed in CSE slots generally had positive views about their experiences. Most thought that it was fair that they were required to work in a CSE assignment, and large majorities reported that they did meaningful work and increased their skills. Nearly 60 percent of respondents reported that they had worked in an unsubsidized job at some point since starting the CSE assignment."

"Most CSE supervisors also reported positive experiences with the program and felt that CSE employees were generally comparable to non-CSE employees doing similar work. Supervisors reported that they went beyond basic supervision to help participants address barriers to stable attendance."